Richard Galvin

Professor and Betty S. Wright Chair in Applied Ethics
Philosophy
Scharbauer Hall 3015C

r.galvin@tcu.edu | 817-257-6371

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Education

Ph.D., Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1983
M.A., Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1980
B.A., Philosophy, Macalester College, 1974

Courses Taught

PHIL 10003 Philosophy One
PHIL 10103 Mind, Meaning, and Morality
PHIL 20303 Moral Problems
PHIL 30303 Ethical Theory
PHIL 30413 Introduction to Philosophy of Law
PHIL 40303 Seminar in Value Theory
PHIL 40333 Philosophy of Law and Economics
PHIL 40343 Advanced Issues in Philosophy of Law

Areas of Focus

PRIMARY RESEARCH AREAS
Applied Ethics, Ethical Theory, Kantian Ethics, Philosophy of Law

ADDITIONAL INTERESTS
History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, Political Philosophy

Galvin, R. Forthcoming. “Freedom and the Fact of Reason.” Kantian Review.

Galvin, R. Forthcoming. “Obligations to the Cognitively Impaired in Nonstructured Contexts,” in Thomas E. Hill and Adam Cureton (eds.), Disability in Practice, Oxford University Press. pp. 204-226.

Galvin, R. 2017. “Kant’s Two Facts of Reason,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 43(1): 37-56.

Galvin, R. and Harris, J. 2014. “Individual Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Climate Change. Analyse & Kritik 36(2): 383-396.

Galvin, R. 2013. “Practical Uncertainty, Practical Contradiction and Logical Contradiction.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 30(4): 349-270.

Harris, J and Galvin, R. 2012. “Pass the Cocoamone, Please’: Causal Impotence, Opportunistic Vegetarianism and Act-Utilitarianism.” Ethics, Policy and Environment 15(3): 1-16.

Galvin, R. and Lockhart, C. 2012. “Limitations on Structural Principles of Distributive Justice: the Case of Discrete Idiosyncratic Goods,” in Kjell Tornblom and Ali Kazami (eds.), A Handbook of Social Resource Theory. Springer. pp. 351-372.

Galvin, R. 2011. “Maxims and Practical Contradictions.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 28(4): 407-419.

Galvin, R. 2011. “Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: Varieties of Kantian Constructivism in Ethics.” Philosophical Quarterly 61(242): 16-36.

Galvin, R. 2010. “Should Kantians be Willing to Embrace ‘Universally Lawful Willing’ as a Good Willl’s Fundamental Principle?” Southwest Philosophy Review 26(2): 33-39.